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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

Organizations are currently moving toward increased pay openness in the workplace; thus, it is
important to determine the influence pay communication practices (pay secrecy and pay openness) have on employee outcomes and whether the increase in pay openness is merited and more
beneficial for organizations. The purpose of this article is to analyze pay communication’s
influence on workplace deviance and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). Specifically,
pay secrecy practices are hypothesized to influence employees to engage in less OCBs and more
workplace deviance. Informational justice and distributive justice perceptions are included as
mediators. Pay secrecy leads to greater workplace deviance as well as less OCBs and justice
perceptions and thus, inferring the pay openness movement is merited. A Pay Communication
scale was developed and validated for this study. Practical implications, limitations, and future
research directions are provided.
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Pay communication is an important organizational
practice, especially since compensation has been indicated by employees to be a significant job factor
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Opsahl & Dunnette, 1966),
and it represents many different things to them (e.g.,
a determinant of social status: Andersson-Straberg,
Sverke, & Hellgren, 2007; an indication of organizational value: Lawler, 1971; a self-esteem booster:
Goodman, 1974). However, organizations vary in their
utilization of pay communication practices, with practices ranging from the usage of a pay secrecy policy as
well as the amount of pay information organizations
present to employees (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992;
Milkovich & Newman, 2005).
In the past, the majority of U.S. organizations have
favored pay secrecy over pay openness practices (Balkin
& Gomez-Mejia, 1985; Hrnext.com Survey, 2001;
Lawler, 1981; Scott, Sperling, McMullen, & Wallace,
2003). However, the usage of pay secrecy practices in
the workplace has been steadily decreasing for the past
few decades. For instance, pay secrecy practices were
utilized by 75% of organizations in 1985 (Balkin &
Gomez-Mejia, 1985), decreased to 36% in 2001
(Hrnext.com Survey, 2001), and then further reduced
to 23% in 2010 (IWPR & Rockefeller Survey of
Economic Security, 2011).
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This recent trend of moving away from pay secrecy
(and toward pay openness) practices is due to several
reasons. First, pay information is more easily attainable
on the Internet through websites such as Salary.com
and Glassdoor.com (Ledford, 2014). Second,
Millennials are entering the workforce and bringing
their attitudes regarding comfortableness with sharing
personal information on social media networks to the
workplace (Lytle, 2014). Third, politicians have been
proposing bills that demonstrate the value of pay openness. For instance, President Barack Obama signed an
executive order in April 2014 prohibiting federal contractors from punishing employees for discussing pay
information or inquiring about pay information. Also,
Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards had the
Louisiana Equal Pay Act passed in April 2016 as well
as stating that “We must also end the archaic and
discriminatory practice of pay secrecy.” Finally, recent
news articles have discussed the benefits of pay openness in the workplace (e.g., Bacharach, 2012; Lally,
2016; Lytle, 2014).
Despite this current movement toward pay openness
in the workplace, there is little known about pay communication and employees’ reactions to the specific
practices utilized by their organization. Since many
companies have moved toward greater pay openness,
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it is essential to determine whether pay openness produces favorable employee outcomes and pay secrecy
influences undesirable employee behaviors. There
have been several studies analyzing pay communication’s impact on task performance (e.g., Bamberger &
Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014;
Belogolovsky, Bamberger, Alterman, & Wagner, 2016;
Futrell & Jenkins, 1978); however, there is a gap in the
literature examining pay communication’s influence on
other employee behaviors that are beneficial or detrimental to an employees’ performance as well as on an
organization’s overall well-being, productivity, and success, such as organizational citizenship behaviors
(OCBs) and workplace deviance.
Since employee task performance has been shown to be
influenced by pay communication practices, OCBs and
workplace deviance may be influenced as well since these
constructs encompass employee performance to some
extent and similar to employee performance may either
contribute or hinder organizational performance and functioning (Lee & Allen, 2002; Motowidlo & Van Scotter,
1994). For instance, OCBs are nonrequired, extra-role
positive work behaviors that may increase an individual
employee’s performance as well as the performance of a
coworker and the organization (e.g., showing up to work
and putting forth effort, following the organization’s rules,
and putting forth voluntary effort to engage in altruism).
On the other hand, workplace deviance is also related to
employee performance but through negative work behaviors (e.g., withholding effort on the job, absenteeism, and
sabotaging equipment), which deteriorate employee performance and harm the organization’s success and proper
functioning. Understanding pay communication’s influence on these employee outcomes is important because
the results will help organizations determine which pay
communication practices should be utilized to potentially
increase employee engagement in OCBs (which is desired
by organizations) and reduce employee participation in
workplace deviance (which is viewed as unfavorable by
organizations). This research ultimately assists organizations in choosing the better pay communication practice,
so its efforts are more successful in increasing desirable
employee behavior (e.g., OCBs) and decreasing unfavorable employee behavior (e.g., workplace deviance), which
lead to better employee and organizational performance
and functioning (Dunlop & Lee, 2004).
Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to
answer Marasi and Bennett’s (2016) call for a better
understanding of pay communication’s influence on
employee outcomes by analyzing pay communication’s
relationship with workplace deviance and OCBs (based
on social exchange theory). Specifically, it is argued that
pay secrecy practices influence employees to engage in
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higher levels of workplace deviance and lower levels of
OCBs. Conversely, the level of engagement in OCBs is
expected to increase while workplace deviance is anticipated to decrease under greater pay openness conditions. Further, informational justice and distributive
justice are expected to mediate the relationship pay
communication has with both workplace deviance and
OCBs (following the organizational justice framework
and fairness heuristic theory). The second purpose of
this article is to develop and validate a Pay
Communication scale. It is necessary and essential to
the pay communication literature (as well as future
research) to substantiate a Pay Communication scale
for two reasons. First, there is not currently a pay
communication measure that has been properly developed and validated. Most of the measures were created
for specific studies (all except Noy’s scale: Noy, 2007),
with the items being generated by the researcher(s)
rather than being developed using proper methodology.
A few of the measures are not generalizable beyond the
study they were designed for due to the specificity of
the items. Second, with the advancements in the pay
communication literature demonstrating there are two
aspects of the pay communication construct (e.g., organizational restriction and employee restriction: Marasi
& Bennett, 2016), a pay communication scale that
encompasses both aspects is needed to match and correspond with the current literature.

Literature review
Pay communication refers to the organizational practice that determines if, when, how, and which pay
information (e.g., pay ranges, individual pay levels,
and the entire pay structure) is conveyed to employees (referred to as the organizational restriction
aspect) and whether discussions involving pay information are permitted amongst employees and potentially outsiders (referred to as the employee
restriction aspect: Marasi & Bennett, 2016). Thus,
there are two aspects that comprise pay communication: organizational restriction and employee restriction (Marasi & Bennett, 2016). Pay communication
practices differ among organizations through variations in the amount and type of pay information
provided to or withheld from employees (organizational restriction), as well as the allowance or restriction of pay discussions among employees (employee
restriction). Therefore, pay communication practices
(including its two aspects) exist along a continuum
and appear in a variety of forms (Burroughs, 1982;
Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007; Lawler,
1981; Lawler & Jenkins, 1992; Patten, 1978). The two
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extremes (and commonly acknowledged practices) of
the pay communication continuum are complete pay
secrecy and complete pay openness, with varying
levels of pay communication practices residing
between the extremes. The extent to which a pay
communication practice is utilized depends on the
needs and strategic goals of the organization.
Pay openness (at the extreme) is an organizational
practice that involves the organization distributing all
pay information to employees on a regular basis,
usually at specific time intervals (such as annually or
quarterly) or upon request. Additionally, employees
are allowed to discuss their personal pay information
with other organizational members and outsiders. On
the other hand, pay secrecy (at the extreme) is an
organizational practice that prohibits management
from distributing and communicating any pay information to employees (Bamberger & Belogolovsky,
2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Colella et al.,
2007; deCarufel, 1986), and usually involves the adoption of a pay secrecy policy that discourages or forbids employees from discussing their personal pay
information with other organizational members and
potentially outsiders (Bamberger & Belogolovsky,
2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Bierman &
Gely, 2004; Burroughs, 1982; Colella et al., 2007;
Gely & Bierman, 2003; Thompson & Pronsky, 1975).
A pay secrecy policy is usually the most detectable
pay communication practice by employees and is
expressed either in writing (such as in employee
manuals) or verbally (such as during employee orientation or an employee meeting). Organizations may
attempt to obtain compliance with a pay secrecy policy by compelling employees to sign a pledge stating
they will not discuss pay information with other
organizational members and outsiders or by having
policy violators suffer disciplinary consequences, such
as termination (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). The
pay secrecy policy intensifies as the policy becomes
more concrete (e.g., written rather than verbal) or the
repercussions for violations of the policy become
more severe (e.g., termination rather than verbal
warning). However, the usage of a pay secrecy policy
violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
except for employees categorized as managers, since
wages (or pay information) are a collective bargaining
issue. Therefore, it is unlawful for organizations to
utilize (whether conveyed in writing or verbally) or
punish nonmanagerial employees for violating illegitimate pay secrecy policies, whether the employees are
unionized or non-unionized.
A variety of pay communication practices (such as
mild pay secrecy or moderate pay openness) reside

along the continuum between the extremes. For
instance, one point on the continuum (representing a
mild pay secrecy practice) may involve employees being
provided with only their personal pay information, as
well as the pay range and pay average for their current
pay grade, and no mention of an “official” pay secrecy
policy. However, a different continuum point (representing a moderate pay openness practice) may involve
employees being supplied with their personal pay information, as well as the pay ranges and pay averages for
their pay grade and the adjacent pay levels in the pay
structure.

Hypotheses and theory development
Workplace deviance is defined as purposeful, normviolating behaviors which have the potential to harm
the organization and/or its members (Robinson &
Bennett, 1995). These employee behaviors include
absenteeism, employee theft, withdrawal of job effort,
and harassment in the workplace. It is important to
understand the antecedents of workplace deviance since
it is estimated to cost U.S. organizations millions of
dollars annually (Case, 2000; Harris & Ogbonna, 2006;
Murphy, 1993), leading the U.S. Department of
Commerce to believe it causes about a third of organizational bankruptcies in the U.S. Additionally, prior
research suggests that a majority of employees have
participated in some form of workplace deviance
(Harper, 1990; Harris & Ogbonna, 2002; Marasi,
Bennett, & Budden, 2018; Slora, 1991), with nearly all
organizations having suffered from one of the costliest
and harmful deviant acts, employee theft (Case, 2000;
Coffin, 2003; Kennedy, 2016). For these reasons, identifying the causes of workplace deviance is imperative
for organizations’ well-being and success.
OCBs are described as extra-role behaviors that are
neither required nor directly rewarded by the organization, yet still contribute to the organization’s overall
effective functioning and success (Organ, 1990). These
employee behaviors are characterized by altruism,
sportsmanship, conscientiousness, and courtesy, and
include behaviors such as helping coworkers, volunteering for extra duties, and offering ideas to improve
organizational functioning (Organ & Ryan, 1995;
Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997). Prior research indicates
that OCBs are related to a variety of positive workplace
outcomes that lead to organizational success, including
enhanced organizational performance, coworker and
managerial productivity, and overall organizational
effectiveness (Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997).
As previously mentioned, pay communication practices have been shown to influence employee task

ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT JOURNAL

performance (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Belogolovsky et al.,
2016). Since workplace deviance and OCBs encompass
employee performance to some extent, it is expected
that pay communication practices will also influence
these constructs. Therefore, pay communication practices may positively or negatively influence employee
behavior that relates to their performance, such as
OCBs and workplace deviance. It is important to identify which pay communication practices (e.g., pay
secrecy or pay openness) influence workplace deviance
and OCBs and to what extent (e.g., increase or reduce
engagement in these behaviors) to ensure employee
performance is good and constructive, leading to organizational success and proper functioning.
Social exchange theory argues that an individual’s
feelings and behaviors will match those of the original
source (Blau, 1964). The theory posits that in an
exchange relationship both parties engage in multiple
interactions that create commitments and expectations
of reciprocity (Emerson, 1976). Over time, the relationship between the two parties evolves into a trusting
relationship such that future interactions will be of a
similar manner. Additionally, social exchange theory
claims an individual will believe an ongoing relationship with the original source is personally beneficial to
him- or herself when the perception of positive interactions is high and trust that the positive interactions
will continue in the future and thus, will respond in
kind by being cooperative. However, when an individual perceives to experience of negative interactions
with the original source, distrusts the other party, or
decides that the relationship is disadvantageous, then
he or she will respond or mirror the original party’s
response in a similarly bad manner. Therefore, employees’ actions are given and offered in reciprocation to
that of the employing organization for expected future
relations and returns. Following social exchange theory,
pay communication’s two main forms (pay secrecy and
pay openness practices) have different implications for
the reciprocation of workplace deviance (negative) and
OCBs (positive) actions toward the organization.
Pay secrecy conditions are expected to lead employees to recognize negative interactions on the employing
organization’s part because the organization is not providing pay information to employees (organizational
restriction) and forbidding employees from discussing
their pay with other employees (employee restriction).
Additionally, the employee restriction aspect tends to
be a legal issue in the U.S. as nonmanagerial employees
have the right to discuss their employment conditions
(e.g., pay information) with other organizational members due to compensation being a collective bargaining
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issue protected by the NLRA. This may present a problem for employees in the U.S. (regardless of whether
employees know a pay secrecy policy is unlawful) as
they believe they have the right to free speech (due to
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) and
take any intrusion on this privilege as a personal threat.
Therefore, pay secrecy practices challenge and encroach
on employees’ freedom and privileges to bargain collectively by prohibiting them from discussing their personal pay information with other employees (employee
restriction). Also, human instincts tell us that the connotation of a “secret” is negative in that something is
wrong, bad, or problematic and consequently, should
have detriments (Frijns, Finkenauer, Vermulst, &
Engels, 2005; Kelly, 2002). Therefore, when organizations do not voluntarily distribute pay information to
employees, the concealment may lead employees to
believe that something is wrong with the compensation
system (e.g., discrepancies exist in the pay structure), in
that if the pay structure was satisfactory and there was
nothing to hide then pay information would be shared
(organizational restriction). Therefore, since employees
perceive organizations to be violating their freedoms
and right to bargain collectively as well as attribute the
hiding of pay information due to the belief that the pay
structure is inequitable, employees are likely to respond
in kind by engaging in negative behaviors of their own,
such as participating in workplace deviance and/or
withholding cooperative and positive work behaviors
(e.g., OCBs).
On the other hand, pay openness practices represent
favorable dealings as the organization demonstrates it is
dedicated to employees in several ways. First, organizations provide employees with pay information (organizational restriction) and permit employees to discuss
their pay information with other organizational members and outsiders (employee restriction). This transparency shows that the organization is not intruding on
the employees’ protected rights by providing pay information (given the pay information is accurate and of
quality, and the amount of pay information conveyed
to the employees is suitable). Also, the openness suggests that there are no problems or discrepancies in the
pay structure (given the reasons for any pay differentials are explained and comply with the organization’s
methods for determining pay). Employees are likely to
view the openness or transparency positively and
believe that the relationship is and will remain beneficial. Therefore, employees will reciprocate the favorable
conduct and treatment by behaving cooperatively, such
as by engaging in OCBs, and thereby creating a mutual
and continuing exchange of benefits (Colquitt, LePine,
Piccolo, Zapata, & Rich, 2012). Additionally, since
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employees believe the relationship is advantageous and
desire to keep it, they are likely not to participate in
workplace deviance.
In support of these arguments, previous research has
found pay secrecy conditions to negatively impact task
performance (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014), while pay openness
conditions have been linked to higher levels of
employee performance (Futrell & Jenkins, 1978).
Therefore, it is expected that employees experiencing
pay secrecy conditions may be less likely to participate
in extra-role behaviors that go beyond their regular job
duties (e.g., OCBs) since they have lower task performance in general and are not fully contributing to their
regular job duties, which may be due to them engaging
in different forms of workplace deviance (e.g., withholding effort). On the other hand, pay openness conditions are anticipated to influence employees to engage
in more OCBs, as they have higher performance levels
and are putting forth more effort in their regular job
duties and thereby are most likely not engaging in
workplace deviance.
Based on the pay communication scale’s design,
higher overall averages represent higher levels of pay
secrecy (whereas lower overall averages indicate higher
levels of pay openness), and therefore, pay communication practices are expected to be positively associated
with workplace deviance and negatively related to
OCBs (in that as pay secrecy increases OCBs will
decrease or as pay openness decreases OCBs will also
decrease). Thus, pay secrecy (rather than pay communication) is used for wording in the hypotheses. The
following hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis 1: Pay secrecy (relative to pay openness) is
positively related to workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 2: Pay secrecy (relative to pay openness) is
negatively related to organizational citizenship behaviors.

Mediators
Perceptions of informational justice and distributive
justice may serve as mediators for the relationship
between pay communication and both workplace
deviance and OCBs. Informational justice refers to
the amount, quality, and timing of information provided to employees that explain the procedures used
to determine outcomes (Bies, Martin, & Brockner,
1993; Greenberg, 1993a). According to the organizational justice framework (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt,
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), perceptions

of informational justice are likely to prevail when
the information is accurate, complete, and given in
a timely manner. Pay openness conditions result in
perceptions of informational justice since the organization is providing complete and accurate information to employees in a timely manner (organizational
restriction) and allowing employees to discuss their
pay information with other employees (employee
restriction) and thereby allowing employees to receive
pay information from the organization and other
organizational members.
Consequently, the theoretical basis for the framework is violated under pay secrecy conditions since
employees are not provided with complete or accurate
pay information or are not given the pay information
in a timely manner. This results from organizations not
providing any pay information to employees throughout their tenure with the organization (organizational
restriction). Additionally, since employees are not
allowed to discuss their pay information with other
organizational members (employee restriction), they
cannot receive complete, accurate, or timely pay information from other organizational members. Therefore,
pay secrecy conditions create informational injustice
perceptions. Perceptions of injustice are likely to cause
employees to feel anger and tension (Homans, 1961),
which, in turn, may lead them to engage in deviant
behaviors to restore justice and/or not participate in
desirable behaviors (e.g., OCBs) since they are feeling
unfairly treated. For instance, informational justice perceptions have been shown to increase OCBs (e.g.,
Colquitt et al., 2001; Liao & Rupp, 2005); whereas,
informational injustice perceptions have yielded greater
levels of workplace deviance (e.g., Greenberg, 1990,
1993a; Jones, 2009). Therefore, perceptions of informational justice are expected to mediate the relationship
between pay communication (pay secrecy) and both
workplace deviance and OCBs. Thus, the following
hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis 3a: Perceptions of informational justice
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy (relative
to pay openness) and workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 3b: Perceptions of informational justice
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy (relative to
pay openness) and organizational citizenship behaviors.
Distributive justice refers to the fairness perceptions
associated with the outcomes distributed by the organization, in this case, pay (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt
et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1990). Distributive justice perceptions are determined by employees’ comparisons of
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their personal outcomes to the outcomes of referent
others. As previously mentioned, pay secrecy prevents
employees from knowing the outcomes (or pay) of
other organizational members. Thus, pay outcome
inferences are based on a guessing game in which pay
estimations are mainly derived from innuendo and
gossip (deCarufel, 1986) and tend to result in inaccurate pay estimations. In support of this, previous studies have demonstrated that employees experiencing
pay secrecy are inclined to overestimate peers’ and
subordinates’ pay (Lawler, 1965a, 1965b, 1967, 1972;
Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978; Milkovich & Anderson,
1972), leading the employees to have negative and
inequitable pay comparisons and perceptions of distributive injustice. Pay openness practices have also been
argued to promote fairness perceptions regarding outcomes (e.g. pay) by providing adequate pay information
(Greenberg, 1990; Lytle, 2014). However, pay openness
practices are most likely to influence positive distributive justice perceptions when pay is in fact equitable.
Therefore, there is the possibility that pay openness
practices may lead to distributive injustice perceptions
when pay is unequal or unfair. Nevertheless, organizations that utilize pay openness practices probably have
an equitable pay structure to avoid potential conflict
and pay discrimination lawsuits. Also, organizations
that have a pay structure that is (or appears to be)
inequitable or unfair are less likely to use a pay openness approach due to various issues (e.g., conflict
among coworkers), and are more likely to hide the
inequitable pay structure with a pay secrecy approach.
Following equity theory (Adams, 1965), employees
may experience an equitable or inequitable (either
underreward or overreward) balance when comparing
their inputs to outcomes ratio to that of a referent
other. According to the theory, when an employee
considers his or her ratio to be equitable to that of a
referent other, the employee will experience distributive
justice perceptions and experience, at a minimum, contentment with the organization for having an equitable
compensation system. These feelings may develop more
positively into satisfaction and lead employees to participate in desirable behaviors (e.g., engage in OCBs and
withdraw from workplace deviance) since they are
satisfied with the compensation system. However,
when comparison ratios result in employees perceiving
they have an underreward inequity or receive less outcomes than the referent other, this leads them to have
perceptions of distributive injustice, which in turn
causes the employees to experience anger and relative
deprivation (Homans, 1961; Jaques, 1961). These feelings lead employees to engage in a variety of methods
to restore justice, such as equalizing (or rebalancing)
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their pay outcome perceptions. These different techniques used to counteract or compensate for the perceived inequity or injustice are likely to be selfish and
potentially harmful behaviors, such as workplace
deviance (e.g., Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002;
Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Greenberg, 1990;
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Zoghbi-Manrique-de-Lara,
2010). For instance, employees may steal to increase
their outcomes or reduce their work effort to decrease
their inputs to balance the comparison and make the
inequity equivalent (e.g., Greenberg, 1990, 1993a).
Therefore, perceptions of distributive justice are
expected to mediate the relationship between pay communication and both workplace deviance and OCBs.
As previously mentioned, pay secrecy conditions
tend to cause employees to overestimate their peers’
and subordinates’ pay (Lawler, 1965a, 1965b, 1967,
1972; Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978; Milkovich &
Anderson, 1972), leading employees to have negative
and inequitable pay comparisons and perceptions of
distributive injustice. Additionally, perceptions of distributive justice have been found to increase OCBs (e.g.,
Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001;
Greenberg, 1993b); whereas, distributive injustice has
demonstrated to increase workplace deviance (e.g.,
Ambrose et al., 2002; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001;
Hershcovis et al., 2007). Therefore, pay secrecy conditions are expected to lead to perceptions of distributive
injustice, which influences more workplace deviance
and less OCBs. Thus, distributive justice perceptions
are anticipated to mediate the relationship between
pay communication and both OCBs and workplace
deviance. The following hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis 4a: Perceptions of distributive justice mediate the relationship between pay secrecy (relative to
pay openness) and workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 4b: Perceptions of distributive justice mediate the relationship between pay secrecy (relative to
pay openness) and organizational citizenship behaviors.
Although pay communication (or pay secrecy) may
have implications for distributive justice based on prior
research, informational justice perceptions may play a
factor in employees determining whether they have
distributive justice or injustice perceptions. For
instance, under pay secrecy conditions an employee
cannot generate accurate and timely pay comparisons
due to the organization not providing employees with
pay information (organizational restriction) and not
allowing employees to discuss their pay with other
organizational members (employee restriction).
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Fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) explains how
informational justice may mediate the pay communication–distributive justice relationship, which influences
workplace deviance and OCBs. Fairness heuristic theory
argues that when specific inferences about a fairness
dimension cannot be identified (e.g., distributive justice)
then other justice perceptions will assist in making inferences (e.g., informational justice), even when the other
justice dimension does not pertain to or relate to the
missing fairness dimension judgment (Lind, 2001).
Therefore, when the most pertinent information is unavailable (e.g., pay information for a referent other), the
missing fairness judgment (e.g., distributive justice) is
determined by a heuristic substitute that is based on less
relevant information that is available (e.g., informational
justice). Although the organizational justice framework
argues that distributive justice perceptions are not possible under pay secrecy conditions since pay information
is unavailable and accurate pay comparisons cannot be
generated, fairness heuristic theory suggests distributive
justice perceptions can be created in a different manner.
Thus, fairness heuristic theory demonstrates how perceptions of informational justice are likely to influence
distributive justice perceptions in that when informational justice is viewed as being unfair (or fair) then
distributive justice will also be perceived to be unfair
(or fair), as the employees use the knowledge they have
in one justice dimension to account for and formulate
their perceptions of justice in the other dimension
regardless of an actual association between the two. As
previously argued, informational justice is expected to
have a negative relationship with pay secrecy due to
information not being accurate, complete, or timely,
and therefore, the expected perceptions of informational
injustice will create distributive justice perceptions that
are also negative under pay secrecy conditions. Thus,
since fairness heuristic theory argues that distributive
justice is dependent upon informational justice, informational justice is anticipated to mediate the relationship between pay communication and distributive
justice. Additionally, distributive justice is expected to
mediate the relationship pay communication and informational justice have with workplace deviance and
OCBs. Therefore, informational justice and distributive
justice (which is expected to be influenced by informational justice) are both expected to mediate the relationship between pay communication and workplace
deviance as well as OCBs. Thus, the following hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis 5: Perceptions of informational justice
mediate the relationship between pay secrecy (relative
to pay openness) and perceptions of distributive justice.

Hypothesis 6a: Perceptions of informational justice
and distributive justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy (relative to pay openness) and
workplace deviance.
Hypothesis 6b: Perceptions of informational justice
and distributive justice mediate the relationship
between pay secrecy (relative to pay openness) and
organizational citizenship behaviors.

Method
Measures
Pay communication
The level of pay communication (pay secrecy or pay
openness) was analyzed using a 17-item scale developed
and validated specifically for this study. The scale measures pay secrecy and pay openness along a continuum,
with pay secrecy being represented by higher overall
scores and pay openness being characterized by lower
overall scores. Specifically, the scale measures employees’ perceptions of the pay communication practices
they are experiencing in the workplace, including
views of organizational policies and actions (e.g., pay
secrecy policy and whether pay information is provided
to employees). The Pay Communication scale has two
subdimensions:
Employee
Restriction
and
Organizational Restriction. Refer to Appendix A for
an overview of the scale items and subdimensions.
Although the scale development process yielded two
subdimensions that are empirically separate aspects of
pay communication, the two subdimensions are highly
correlated (as demonstrated below in the explanation of
the scale development process) and together allow for a
holistic approach to analyze the pay communication
construct (or pay communication perceptions) to be
analyzed. Since the purpose of this study is to analyze
the entire construct of pay communication and its
influence on workplace behaviors, the overall Pay
Communication scale was utilized for hypotheses testing, rather than the individual subdimensions or
aspects. The scale was measured using a 7-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree). Seven of the items were reverse
coded. Examples of the scale’s items are “I am provided
my job’s pay range” and “My organization makes it
clear that pay should not be discussed under any circumstances.” The coefficient alpha for this scale is .94.
Three multistage studies were conducted independently from this study to properly develop and validate
the Pay Communication scale. Study 1, Instrument
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Development, involved two stages. In stage 1, Item
Generation, a large, inclusive pool of items about pay
communication practices was generated by 24 Society
for Human Resource Management (SHRM) members
as well as the lead researcher, which resulted in 79
items. For Item Refinement, stage 2 of study 1, 11
PhD academics in the management discipline with an
emphasis in human resource management rated and
reviewed each of the items based on three criteria
involving the degree to which each item has consistency
with the pay communication description (either pay
secrecy or pay openness), generalizability to a wide
variety of organizations and occupations, and clarity
and conciseness (requests for editing of items or item
deletion were allowed in this portion). Items that
received a mean score of 3.0 or less on any of the
three rating criteria or were requested to be deleted
by the judges were eliminated from further analysis.
This stage yielded 42 items for further analysis.
Study 2, Scale Evaluation, also comprised two stages.
The sample consisted of 306 participants and was
recruited using an online survey panel, Qualtrics.
Once the participants completed the survey of the
remaining 42 items, the researchers analyzed the data
in two stages. The Item Selection Process stage (stage 1)
involved evaluating the items based on item-total correlations and variances. Items demonstrating high
inter-item correlations with other items in the same
subcategory were selected to be included in the subdimensions since a scale should consist of highly interrelated items (DeVellis, 2012). Additionally, items with
low variances (below 1.5) were eliminated since they do
not allow differences between the participants to be
established (DeVellis, 2012). This process resulted in
38 items remaining in the analyses. Stage 2 involved
conducting an exploratory factor analysis. Items were
evaluated on their interrelationships (factor weights
and factor loadings) using a principal axis factor analysis with direct oblique rotation. A factor weight of .40
was used as the minimum cutoff. Due to prior research
demonstrating pay communication being comprised of
two aspects (employee and organizational restrictions:
Marasi & Bennett, 2016), the maximum number of
factors allowed for items to load on was two as each
item should either load on the employee restriction or
the organizational restriction factor. Items were only
allowed to load on one factor with the minimum difference between weights for an item on different factors
having to be more than .10. Items not meeting the
requirements were eliminated from the analyses,
which resulted in 24 items remaining for further analyses. Refer to Table B1 in Appendix B for an overview
of the item loadings on the two factors.
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Two stages comprised Study 3, Scale Validation.
There were 611 participants for this study and they
were recruited from an online survey organization,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The remaining items
from Study 2 were evaluated by the researchers in the
two stages after the participants completed the survey
with the remaining 24 items. In stage 1,
Dimensionality, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
using Amos 24 was conducted to evaluate the fit of the
measurement model (e.g., the relationship between the
items and the subfactors), to establish convergence for
each subfactor (based on the items), and to cross-validate the dimensionality of the scale by comparing the
two-factor model to the one-factor model. First, a CFA
was performed on each subfactor (or first-order latent
variables) of the Pay Communication construct as proposed in the EFA solution from Study 2. Each independent analysis showed that each subfactor demonstrated
reliability by having a suitable Cronbach’s alpha coefficient above .90 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).
Additionally, the fit indices for each subfactor measurement model indicated that each subfactor demonstrated a good fit (Hair et al., 2010).
Second, three methods were used to establish convergence for each subfactor: the factor loadings (with
each item having at least a .50 loading on a subfactor),
the average variance extracted or AVE (with each subfactor having an AVE of at least 50%), and the reliability of each subfactor by means of Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients (with each subfactor having a minimum of
.70). Three items in the first factor and four items in
the second factor did not meet the minimum factor
loading of .50, yielding 17 items remaining. Of the 17
remaining items, 16 have a factor loading higher than
.70 and one item has a factor loading above a .50 (Hair
et al., 2010). The elimination of these seven items
produced a better fit to the subfactor models (refer to
Table C1). As shown (refer to Appendix C), both subfactors have an AVE above 70% and a Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient above .90. Thus, each subfactor exhibits its
own convergence.
For the final step in the Dimensionality stage, a
second-order CFA was conducted to determine
whether the Pay Communication construct was better
represented by the two-factor model or one-factor
model (where pay communication is a first-order latent
variable). As shown in Table C1 (refer to Appendix C),
the two-factor model demonstrates a better fit for the
pay communication variable than the one-factor model.
Additionally, there is a significant correlation of .41
between the subfactors (p < 0.001). Therefore, the two
subfactors demonstrate a convergence on a common
underlying construct (Lages, Lages, & Lages, 2005),
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which further suggests a second-order model accounts
for the data better than a first-order model (or onefactor model). Based on these results, the two-factor
model displays a better fit.
The second stage of Study 3, Convergent and
Discriminant Validity, involved establishing convergent
validity and discriminant validity for the overall Pay
Communication scale. For convergent validity, the scale
was compared with Noy’s (2007) POPS scale, Mulvey
and colleagues’ (Mulvey, LeBlanc, Heneman, &
McInerney, 2002) Pay Knowledge Scale, and Day’s
(2006) Pay Communication scale. However, none of
these scales has been independently analyzed for construct validity and only Noy’s (2007) scale was properly
developed, but they are the only pay communication
measures available to establish convergent validity since
they are the only scales that can be generalized to
multiple organizations and occupations. Since Day’s
(2006) and the Mulvey and colleagues’ (2002) scales
have pay openness representing the higher scale points,
their correlations with the Pay Communication scale
developed for this study should be negative (as pay
secrecy represents the higher scale points for this
scale). The results show that the Pay Communication
scale is significantly correlated with the other pay communication measures (p < .01), and thus, evidence of
convergent validity is provided for the overall Pay
Communication scale (refer to Table C2 in
Appendix C).
Discriminant validity for the overall Pay
Communication scale developed in this article was
established by comparing it with a modified adaptation
of Huselid’s (1995) High Performance Work Practices
(HPWP) measure, which consists of two subdimensions: Employee Skills and Organizational Structures,
and Employee Motivation. Huselid’s (1995) HPWP
scale was utilized for discriminant validity because it
analyzes organizational work practices that are dissimilar from pay communication practices. Therefore,
Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale is expected to have low,
yet most likely still significant, correlations with the Pay
Communication scale due to both scales encompassing
organizational practices. Discriminant validity was
determined using the correlation comparison method
and by comparing the shared variance (e.g., the square
of the correlation) among the Pay Communication
scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the
scales’ AVE. The results of the correlation comparison
between the Pay Communication scale and Huselid’s
(1995) HPWP scale show that the overall HPWP scale
and its two subdimensions are significantly correlated
with the Pay Communication scale and both of its
subfactors, except in one correlation (refer to

Table C2 in Appendix C). However, with the exception
of those regarding the Organizational Restriction subfactor, the correlations are substantially smaller than
the correlations that the Pay Communication scale has
with the majority of the other pay communication
measures. The larger correlations between the HPWP
scale (and its subdimensions) and the Organizational
Restriction subfactor are expected since they both measure different organizational practices. The comparison
of the shared variance among the Pay Communication
scale and Huselid’s (1995) HPWP scale to each of the
scales’ AVE is shown in Table C3 (refer to Appendix
C). As shown, the squared correlation of each pair (the
Pay Communication scale or a subfactor and the
HPWP scale or a subdimension) was lower than the
AVE for each of the constructs involved, and therefore,
evidence of discriminate validity is provided for the Pay
Communication scale. Thus, the Pay Communication
scale demonstrates construct validity.
Workplace deviance
The extent to which the participants engaged in deviant
behaviors in the workplace was measured with an
adapted version of Bennett and Robinson’s (2000)
scale, which consisted of 28 items. Item examples
include “Put little effort into my work” and “Said something hurtful to someone at work.” The items were
measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale with points
of 0 (never), 1 (once a year), 2 (twice a year), 3 (several
times a year), 4 (monthly), 5 (weekly), and 6 (daily). The
coefficient alpha produced for this scale is .91.
Organizational citizenship behaviors
The degree to which participants engaged in OCBs was
analyzed using a modification of Williams and Anderson’s
(1991) 14-item scale. The nature of the items was adapted
to allow the participants to self-report the behaviors.
Examples of the items include “Gave advance notice
when unable to come to work” and “Helped others who
had heavy workloads.” The items were measured using a 7point Likert-type scale matching that of workplace
deviance, with scale points being 0 (never), 1 (once a
year), 2 (twice a year), 3 (several times a year), 4 (monthly),
5 (weekly), and 6 (daily). The coefficient alpha generated for
this scale is .70.
Informational and distributive justice
Participants’ perceptions of justice were measured with
Colquitt’s (2001) distributive justice and informational justice scales. Distributive justice was measured with four
items, with item examples being “Does your pay reflect
the effort you have put into your work?” and “Is your pay
appropriate for the work you have completed?”
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Informational justice was measured with five items, with
examples of the items including “Has your supervisor
communicated details about pay procedures in a timely
manner?” and “Has your supervisor been candid in his/
her communications with you when discussing pay procedures?” Both of the justice scales were measured using a 5point Likert-type scale with points of 1 (never), 2 (to a small
extent), 3 (somewhat), 4 (to a large extent), and 5 (always).
The coefficient alpha is .94 for distributive justice and .87
for informational justice.
Control variables
Age and gender were controlled for based on previous
research showing that males (Hershcovis et al., 2007)
and younger employees (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007;
Ng & Feldman, 2008) tend to engage in higher levels of
deviant behaviors. Gender was measured categorically:
female = 0, male = 1. Age was measured in categorical
years: 1 = 18–19 years, 2 = 20–29 years, 3 = 30–39 years,
4 = 40–49 years, 5 = 50–59 years, 6 = 60–68 years.
Dummy variables were generated to control for age.

Sample and procedure
Participants were recruited using a third-party online survey organization, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Those who
completed the anonymous survey were compensated
directly by the online survey organization. Participants
consented to complete the research survey voluntarily
and then were given instructions to answer the scale
items and demographic questions. There were several
prescreening items used during the data collection process,
such as that the participants had to be at least 18 years old,
reside in the United States, and be currently employed
(due to the pay communication scale referring to the
participants’ perceptions of their current employers’ pay
communication practices). Seven instructed response
items were also used to ensure participants were paying
attention and responding to each question accurately (e.g.,
“Mark slightly agree for this item”). Participants who did
not meet all of the requirements of the prescreening items
or missed one of the instructed response items were
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excluded from the sample. The participants were completely anonymous to the researchers. Given the conditions of
how Mechanical Turk works, a response rate cannot be
identified.
There were 611 participants. The majority of the
participants were female (57.9%), Caucasian (73.6%),
working full-time (81.5%), and possessed at least a
bachelor’s degree (70.5%). Also, for most of the participants there was no labor union involvement for their
job or any jobs in their organization (73.3%). The
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 68 years, with
more than 40% of the participants being in their twenties and one-third of the participants (33.4%) being in
their thirties. The mean age was 34 years. Most of the
participants indicated they had been with their current
employer for one to five years (55%) and were classified
as an “employee” with no managerial duties (62.2%).

Results
Table 1 shows the correlations, means, standard deviations, and coefficient alphas for the scales used in this
study. For all analyses, each independent variable (e.g.,
pay communication, informational justice, and distributive justice) was mean centered to minimize the
effects of nonessential ill conditioning (e.g., multicollinearity among the variables) for better result interpretation (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).
Common method variance
The existence of common method variance (CMV) is a
potential problem with survey data. Therefore, multiple
procedural remedies were utilized in the design to
reduce or eliminate the bias, such as counterbalancing
or randomizing question order of the variable scales in
the survey, reducing evaluation apprehension (informing participants that there are no right or wrong
answers and therefore, all items should be responded
to as honestly as possible), and guaranteeing anonymity
for all participants (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003). Additionally, Harman’s single-factor

Table 1. Descriptive statistics, means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations.
Variable
1. Gender
2. Age
3. Pay communication
4. Informational justice
5. Distributive justice
6. Organizational citizenship behaviors
7. Workplace deviance

M
1.58
3.00
3.76
3.20
2.76
4.10
.96

SD
.49
1.13
1.44
1.03
1.18
.76
.78

1
—
.09*
.07↑
−.11**
−.18**
−.18**
.16**

2

3

4

5

6

7

—
.05
−.01
−.02
.08*
−.23**

.94
−.45**
−.34**
−.02
.11**

.87
.67**
.09*
−.13**

.94
−.01
−.07↑

.70
−.12**

.91

Note. N = 611. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (reliabilities) are shown on the diagonal in boldface. Control variables were measured by self-reports and
categorical variables.
↑
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.
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test (Brewer, Campbell, & Crano, 1970; Harman, 1960)
and the correlational marker technique (Lindell &
Whitney, 2001) were conducted and neither method
demonstrated signs of CMV’s presence. Thus, this
study most likely does not suffer from CMV.

CFI = .65; IFI = .65; RMSEA = .19), and one-factor
model (chi-squared = 4544.78, df = 135; p < .01;
CFI = .46; IFI .47; RMSEA = .23).

Tests of hypotheses
Confirmatory factor analysis
A CFA using Amos 24 was conducted to demonstrate
discriminant validity of the latent variables included in
the theoretical model (refer to Figure 1 for the overall
model). To prevent the parameter estimates from
exceeding that needed for sample size ratio, three parcels were created using the domain-representative
approach for the following constructs: pay communication, workplace deviance, and OCBs. The domainrepresentative approach involves creating parcels by
combining items from the subdimensions into each
parcel. This approach to parceling accounts for multidimensionality by having each parcel represent the
different subdimensions and results in “better stability
and fit” as well as “acceptable estimates of all parameters” (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman,
2002, p. 168). All items were used as indicators for
distributive justice and informational justice to avoid
having only one or two parcels per construct, which
would result in an underidentified model (Kline, 2011).
Results suggested that this model had a good fit: chisquared = 418.07, df = 125, p < .01; confirmatory fit
index (CFI) = .96; incremental fit index (IFI) = .96; root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06.
Additionally, this model had a better fit compared to
the alternate four-factor model (chi-squared = 1061.31,
df = 129, p < .01; CFI = .89; IFI = .89; RMSEA = .11),
three-factor model (chi-squared = 2606.52, df = 132,
p < .01; CFI = .70; IFI = .70; RMSEA = .18), two-factor
model (chi-squared = 3047.70, df = 134, p < .01;

We tested the model shown in Figure 1 using structural
equation modeling (SEM) in Amos 24. The same parcels and indicators used for the latent variables in the
CFA were also used in the structural model. Therefore,
all of the items for distributive justice and informational justice were used as indicators, and the remaining three constructs used three parcels each (e.g., pay
communication, workplace deviance, and OCBs). The
structural model provided a good fit to the data: chisquared = 549.46, df = 221, p < .01; CFI = .97; IFI = .97;
RMSEA = .05. The standardized path coefficients from
Amos is shown in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 1 predicted pay secrecy to be positively
related to workplace deviance. The direct relationship
between pay secrecy and workplace deviance is significant and positive (b = .07**, not shown in Figure 1),
indicating that higher levels of pay secrecy results in
greater workplace deviance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is
supported. Pay secrecy was predicted to negatively
influence OCBs in Hypothesis 2. The direct relationship between pay communication and OCBs was not
significant (b = –.02, not shown in Figure 1). Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b involve informational justice
mediating the relationships between pay secrecy and
both workplace deviance and OCBs. Informational justice was expected to mediate the pay communication–
workplace deviance relationship in Hypothesis 3a. As
shown in Figure 1, Hypothesis 3a is supported as the
pay communication to informational justice path was
significant (b = –.40**) and the path from

Informational
Justice

–.12*

–.40**

.20**

Workplace
Deviance

.03
Pay
Communication

.70**
.03
.00

OCBs

.03
-.13*
Distributive
Justice

Figure 1. Structural equation modeling results with standardized path loadings. N = 611. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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informational justice to workplace deviance was significant (b = –.12*). The extent of the mediation was
analyzed. Since the direct relationship between pay
communication and workplace deviance is significant
(b = .07**, not shown), but the relationship decreases to
become nonsignificant with the presence of the mediator (b = .03), this demonstrates that informational
justice fully mediates the relationship between pay
communication and workplace deviance (Hair et al.,
2010).
Informational justice was anticipated to mediate the
relationship between pay communication and OCBs in
Hypothesis 3b. Since the direct relationship between pay
communication and OCBs is not significant, tests of mediation are generally not warranted. However, multiple
scholars have argued that inconsistent mediation occurs
when “at least one mediated effect has a different sign than
other mediated or direct effects in a model” and tends to be
“more common in multiple mediator models where
mediated effects have different signs” (MacKinnon,
Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007, pp. 200–201: e.g., Blalock, 1969;
Davis, 1985; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000).
Inconsistent mediation results from the mediator acting
as a suppressor variable (Ludlow & Klein, 2014).
Additionally, the mediator is significantly correlated with
the causal or independent variable. Therefore, a test of
mediation involving pay communication and OCBs is
warranted as the criteria of a mediated effect does have a
different sign and there is a significant correlation between
the independent variable and the mediator. As shown in
Figure 1, informational justice did significantly mediate the
relationship as the path from pay communication to informational justice was significant (b = –.40**) and the path
from informational justice to OCBs was significant
(b = .20**), and therefore, Hypothesis 3b is supported.
Therefore, inconsistent mediation occurred (Ludlow &
Klein, 2014; MacKinnon et al., 2007).
Hypotheses 4a and 4b proposed distributive justice to
mediate the relationship between pay communication
and both workplace deviance and OCBs. Specifically,
Hypothesis 4a anticipated the pay communication–
workplace deviance relationship would be mediated by
distributive justice; whereas, Hypothesis 4b proposed the
pay communication–OCBs relationship would be
mediated by distributive justice. As shown in Figure 1,
distributive justice did not mediate the relationships as
the relationship from pay communication to distributive
justice was not significant (b = .00), and therefore,
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are not supported.
Informational justice was also predicted to mediate
the relationship between pay communication and distributive justice in Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis was supported, as the paths from pay communication to
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informational justice (b = –.40**) and then to distributive justice (b = .70**) are significant. The extent of the
mediation was analyzed by testing the direct path
between pay communication and distributive justice
with and without informational justice in the model as
the mediator. The results show that pay communication
has a significant relationship with distributive justice
when informational justice is not in the model
(b = –.28**, not shown), but the path becomes nonsignificant when informational justice is in the model
(b = .00). Thus, informational justice fully mediates the
pay communication–distributive justice relationship.
Hypotheses 6a and 6b proposed that both informational
justice and distributive justice, respectively, would both
mediate the relationship between pay communication and
both workplace deviance (H6a) and OCBs (H6b). The path
from distributive justice to workplace deviance was not
significant (b = .03), and therefore, Hypothesis 6a is not
supported.
As previously mentioned, inconsistent mediation warrants testing for Hypothesis 6b. Since the paths from pay
communication to informational justice (b = –.40**), then
to distributive justice (b = .70**), and then to OCBs
(b = –.13*) were all significant, Hypothesis 6b is supported.
Therefore, inconsistent mediation occurred. To establish
further support for informational justice and distributive
justice having inconsistent mediation on the relationship
between pay communication and OCBs, hierarchical
regression analysis was used to examine the overall relationship. The results of the regression are significant (refer
to Table 2) and thus, informational justice and distributive
justice together have inconsistent mediation on the pay
communication–OCBs relationship. However, since the
effect level for informational justice increased after the
inclusion of distributive justice as a predictor in the
model (b = .12**; b = .19**, respectively) and distributive
justice is not significantly correlated with OCBs without the
presence of informational justice (b = .01, not shown),
distributive justice is acting more as a suppressor variable
than informational justice (Ludlow & Klein, 2014). This
type of suppressor variable is “a useful determining variate
without causal connection with the dependent variate”
(Mendershausen, 1939, p. 99). Essentially, this means that
distributive justice removes extraneous variation in informational justice and therefore, strengthens the relationship
between informational justice and OCBs (thus, making the
relationship more valid) since distributive justice is not
correlated with OCBs, but is related to the other predictor
variables, informational justice and pay communication
(Ludlow & Klein, 2014). Additionally, this situation regarding a third variable being a suppressor and increasing “the
magnitude of the relationship” is possible (MacKinnon
et al., 2000, p. 174).

70

S. MARASI ET AL.

Table 2. Results of hierarchical regression analysis for Hypothesis 6b.
Organizational citizenship behaviors
Model 1
Variable
Step 1: Control variables
Gender
Age
Step 2: Main effect
Pay communication
Step 3: First mediation
Informational justice
Step 4: Second mediation
Distributive justice
Total R2
Total F value
(df regression, residual)

ΔR2
.04**

β

Model 2
ΔR2

.18**
.07↑

β

Model 3
ΔR2

.18**
.07↑
.01

−.04

β

Model 4
ΔR2

β

.19**
.07↑

.18**
.07↑

.02

.01

.01**
.12**

.19**
.01*

−.10*

.06
7.15**
(5, 605)

Note. N = 611. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. ΔR2 is based upon variables included in each step.
↑
p < .10; * p < .07; ** p < .01.

Discussion
Since earlier research has emphasized the relevance of
positive and negative discretionary work behaviors in
influencing organizational productivity and success
(Dunlop & Lee, 2004), OCBs and workplace deviance
are important outcome variables for pay communication researchers to consider and have not been previously investigated. This study shows how a common
organizational practice, the pay communication practice utilized by a company (or how the manner in
which organization’s share pay information or permit
discussions about pay information), influences
employee outcomes. This study contributes to the
underdeveloped pay communication literature in several ways.
First, the findings show that greater levels of pay
secrecy conditions have a negative influence on
employee behavior by increasing employee participation in workplace deviance, while reducing engagement
in OCBs. Alternatively, employees experiencing greater
levels of pay openness conditions have a positive influence through engagement in more OCBs and less deviant behaviors. Overall, the results of this study suggest
that the movement toward pay openness in the workplace may be merited. Therefore, the current trend of
increasing pay openness in the workplace appears to be
more beneficial to organizations and their success than
the usage of pay secrecy conditions. Organizations utilizing greater pay openness conditions experience more
altruistic behaviors from their employees, which ultimately further helps the organization be more productive and successful. Additionally, the usage of a pay
openness approach not only weakens employees’ participation in workplace deviance but also reduces the
expenses associated with the deviant acts (e.g., costs of
stolen merchandise or decreased effort) and the

monitoring of preventing deviant behaviors (e.g.,
video surveillance).
Additionally, the discovery of the significant mediating effects of informational justice and distributive justice assists both researchers and organizations in
understanding why certain pay communication practices may lead employees to engage in negative behaviors (workplace deviance) or to withhold positive
behaviors (OCBs) by influencing employee attitudes,
which harm both coworkers and organizational success.
Specifically, pay secrecy conditions lead to perceptions
of informational injustice and distributive injustice. It is
understandable that perceptions of injustice would
influence employees’ participation levels in desirable
or deviant behaviors and therefore, it may be more
beneficial for organizations to utilize a more open pay
communication approach to reduce these negative
perceptions.
Although the hypothesis for distributive justice
being a mediator for the relationships between pay
communication and the outcomes (e.g., workplace
deviance and OCBs) was not supported due to the
path from pay communication and distributive justice not being significant, it should be noted that the
relationship between pay communication (pay
secrecy) and distributive justice has a significant
path when informational justice is not included in
the model (b = –.28**). This finding offers support
for earlier studies demonstrating that employees tend
to overestimate their peers’ and subordinates’ pay
and underestimate their superiors’ pay in pay secrecy
conditions (Lawler, 1965a, 1965b, 1967, 1972;
Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978; Milkovich & Anderson,
1972). Therefore, pay secrecy conditions influence
employees to experience distributive injustice.
However, since informational justice mediates the
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pay communication–distributive justice relationship,
the misestimations (or perceptions of distributive
injustice) appear to be founded on a guessing game,
innuendo, and/or gossip, as suggested by deCarufel
(1986). This mediated relationship is not surprising,
as employees cannot properly determine pay equity
or generate accurate ratio comparisons with a referent other and determine whether distributive justice
is present in their current situation without correct
pay information (or informational justice). Thus, pay
openness influences justice perceptions positively
(e.g., informational justice and distributive justice),
which in turn influences a reduction in workplace
deviance participation and an enhancement in OCBs.
Additionally, distributive justice as a suppressor
variable for informational justice can be explained theoretically. Following the organizational justice framework, informational justice and distributive justice are
two of the four dimensions of organizational justice
and have been shown to be correlates (Colquitt, 2001;
Colquitt et al., 2001). Therefore, organizational justice
theory provides a foundation for how distributive justice is a suppressor variable for informational justice.
Since they are correlates, distributive justice clarifies the
relationship between informational justice and OCBs,
thereby making the informational justice–OCBs relationship more valid. Therefore, this situation (e.g., distributive justice being correlated with the other
predictor variables, informational justice and pay communication, but not with the dependent variable,
OCBs) has been recommended as a good design strategy since irrelevant variance is being suppressed in
informational justice and the relationship between
informational justice and OCBs is being enhanced
(Ludlow & Klein, 2014).
A final but important contribution of this research is
the development and validation of a pay communication scale. Since there is currently not a substantiated
measure, the Pay Communication scale validated in this
study is an essential contribution that can assist scholars in conducting future research involving pay communication. The main purpose of the scale
development process was to create a scale that measured pay communication perceptions on a continuum
(from complete pay secrecy to complete pay openness)
and encompassed the two aspects of pay communication: employee restriction and organizational restriction. The Pay Communication scale substantiated as
part of this study is a major contribution and enticement for future scholars to pursue research in pay
communication, allowing both aspects (employee
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restrictions and organizational restrictions) to be investigated together or separately.
Practical implications
Organizations should consider the impact the pay communication approach they are utilizing has on
employee outcomes, such as workplace deviance and
OCBs, as these behaviors ultimately affect organizational outcomes, such as profitability and overall success. The results suggest that moving toward a pay
openness approach may be advantageous for organizations as well as employees. Pay openness appears to
engender positive attitudes in employees, such as perceptions of informational justice and distributive justice, which may result in organizations being more
profitable as employees tend to participate in more
OCBs, which may, in turn, increase employee productivity (and ultimately, organizational productivity).
Also, the positive attitudes that seem to result from a
more open pay communication approach appear to
decrease employees’ engagement in workplace
deviance, which may consequently reduce losses to
the organization (both in capital from sabotage and
theft, and in productivity from slacking), as well as
the organization’s costs of monitoring or deviant behavior reduction mechanisms (e.g., video surveillance).
Another practical implication of this study is the
percentage of participants admitting to engaging in
workplace deviance. Interestingly, the participants of
this study were rather honest, as 98.5% of the sample
indicated they engaged in at least one deviant act within
the past 6 months of the study being conducted. This
extreme honesty, which is most likely due to the complete anonymity guaranteed to all participants, helps
researchers and organizations better understand the
amount of deviant behaviors occurring in the workplace.
This is an important finding as this study suggests nearly
all employees engage in deviant behaviors. This level of
workplace deviance engagement is similar to that of
other studies (e.g., Marasi, Bennett, & Budden, 2018).
Thus, the prevalence and extreme costs of workplace
deviance suggest it is essential for organizations to find
ways to reduce the enticement for participating in deviant acts, and utilizing a more open pay communication
approach appears to be a method to do so.
However, it should be noted that the pay communication approach chosen and used is based on the organization’s needs and strategic goals. A specific pay
communication approach is affected by multiple factors
that make the chosen approach at times advantageous or

72

S. MARASI ET AL.

detrimental to organizations and employees (Colella
et al., 2007; Gely & Bierman, 2003). Therefore, a pay
openness approach may not be the right approach for
every organization. Some organizations may need to
utilize a pay secrecy approach or some level of pay
secrecy in their pay communication approach for strategic reasons. For instance, an organization utilizing a payfor-performance system may prefer a pay secrecy
approach since these systems fail in pay openness conditions as pay allocations shift toward equality rather
than reflecting performance levels (Bartol & Martin,
1989; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Leventhal,
Michaels, & Sanford, 1972). However, a pay secrecy
approach allows management to allocate more appropriate pay increases to employees based on performance
levels rather than providing a narrow range of pay
increases to employees in order to avoid conflict or
have to explain their actions (Bartol & Martin, 1989;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Gomez-Mejia &
Balkin, 1992; Lytle, 2014) as well as evade negative reactions from employees who receive lower pay raises or
bonuses (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Leventhal et al.,
1972). Additionally, an organization facing high turnover may utilize an approach that leans more toward the
pay secrecy extreme since this makes poaching more
difficult (Colella et al., 2007) and reduces employee
mobility, which in turn decreases organizational turnover and costs associated with recruiting, selecting, and
training new employees (Danziger & Katz, 1997).
Limitations and suggestions for future research
Although tremendous efforts were taken to strengthen the
methodology of this study, there are potential limitations as
well as numerous suggestions for future research. The first
limitation is that the research design is cross-sectional and
therefore, causal inferences are not warranted. However, it
would be very beneficial for future research to investigate
the causal relationship that pay communication has with
workplace deviance and OCBs, as well as other employee
and organizational outcomes. Causal inferences could be
acquired by analyzing employees’ behaviors and attitudes
before, during, and after their employing organization
changes the pay communication approach being utilized
from a form of pay secrecy to a version of pay openness or
vice versa. This type of investigation would be very advantageous to scholars and practitioners.
The data collection being based on self-reports is
another potential limitation. However, the nature of the
constructs being measured (e.g., perceptions of pay communication practices, attitudes toward justice, and participation in workplace deviance) require the use of self-report
data since employees are the only ones who can accurately

respond to items pertaining to their own perceptions,
attitudes, and behaviors. For instance, with the pay communication scale it is more relevant to measure employees’
pay communication perceptions rather than the actual pay
communication approach utilized by the organization,
since employees may not be fully aware of all pay communication features the organization has implemented.
Additionally, employees tend to keep their engagement in
deviant behaviors secret from other organizational members (Spector, 1992), thereby making self-report data necessary and appropriate as it generally provides a more
accurate assessment of workplace deviance (given that the
participants are being truthful in their engagement levels of
workplace deviance, which was the case in this study).
Another potential limitation is the possibility of this
study suffering from social desirability bias. However,
the guarantee of anonymity to all participants and the
finding of 98.5% of the sample indicating they engaged
in at least one type of deviant behavior in the past 6
months demonstrate that social desirability is unlikely
to be an issue in this study.
The lack of utilizing procedural justice in the model
is also a potential limitation and avenue for future
direction. However, pay levels are the biggest concern
for employees (Day, 2006) rather than pay processes as
employees do not have a good understanding of pay
processes (Mulvey et al., 2002). Therefore, procedural
justice is of a less concern than informational and
distributive justice regarding pay communication.
Additionally, meta-analytic results show distributive
and informational justice have higher correlations
with different forms of workplace deviance (e.g., withdrawal, theft, and organizational retaliatory behaviors)
than procedural justice, and all three justice dimensions
have similar correlations with OCBs (Colquitt et al.,
2001). Also, previous pay communication research
shows procedural justice failed to have an influence
on employee task performance (Bamberger &
Belogolovsky, 2010), despite meta-analytic results
demonstrating procedural justice to have a much
higher correlation with performance than the other
justice dimensions (Colquitt et al., 2001). Thus, procedural justice was not included in the model since it did
not properly work as expected (based on meta-analytic
results) in a prior pay communication study, and distributive justice and informational justice are expected
to have a greater influence on the outcome variables
(e.g., workplace deviance and OCBs) and both are to be
of a bigger concern regarding pay. However, a future
direction is to examine the role procedural justice has
with pay communication practices.
The external validity of the results is another limitation of this study. The findings may not be
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generalizable to countries other than the United States
since the sample was comprised of only U.S. residents.
Consequently, another future path may involve generalizing these findings to countries other than the U.S.
Even though labor laws may differ between countries,
employee compensation and the organizational pay
practices (e.g., pay communication practices) used in
different countries may resemble that of the United
States, especially in developed countries. Therefore, it
may be beneficial to conduct an international study
analyzing the relationship pay communication has
with workplace deviance and OCBs.
The Pay Communication scale design is another
potential limitation. The scale measures employees’ perceptions of pay communication practices experienced in
the workplace rather than actual pay communication
practices used by the organization, actual employee behavior (e.g., discussing pay information with others), or how
pay information is disseminated (e.g., available online,
provided in an annual document, or given orally by
management). Therefore, some forms of pay communication may not be included in the Pay Communication
scale (e.g., employee behavior). However, employees’ perceptions of pay communication practices used may be a
better method for analyzing pay communication since
employees may not know what pay communication practices are actually used in their organization, resulting in a
potential data collection issue. Although organizations
could be contacted directly about their pay communication practices, they may not provide truthful information
regarding their pay communication practices, such as
whether a pay secrecy policy is being used (whether formal or informal), since restricting employees from discussing pay violates the NLRA, potentially causing issues
in the data collection process, data analyses, and explaining the results.
A final path for future research is to examine other
outcomes pay communication may influence. Specifically,
envy, organizational commitment, and organizational
identification are potential outcomes that should be examined in future studies. Since the Pay Communication scale
has two subdimensions (organizational restriction and
employee restriction), it may be worthwhile for future
researchers to examine which pay communication aspect
or subdimension influences specific employee attitudes
and behaviors. Additionally, an examination of moderating
variables that are within the organization’s control (e.g.,
disciplinary procedures) should be conducted to demonstrate how they impact the relationship between pay communication practices and employee outcomes, such as
potentially further minimizing workplace deviance as well
as other employee outcomes.
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Appendix A
Pay Communication Scale
Employee Restriction (α = .96)
(1) An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
(2) My organization does not allow employees to discuss
their own pay with coworkers.
(3) My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids
employees from discussing their pay with each other.
(4) My organization has a policy forbidding employees
from discussing pay information with coworkers.
(5) My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
(6) My organization is very strict in regard to employees
not talking about pay.
(7) My organization makes it clear that pay should not be
discussed under any circumstances.
(8) My organization suggests individual pay information
should be kept private.
(9) My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
(10) There is a statement in my organization’s employee
handbook/manual stating employees should not discuss their pay with coworkers.
Organizational Restriction (α = .91)
(1) I am provided my job’s pay range. (R)
(2) I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently available. (R)
(3) I know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the
average pay for my job. (R)
(4) My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I
understand. (R)
(5) My organization makes it clear how pay is determined
for my job. (R)
(6) My organization makes the entire pay structure/model
available. (R)
(7) My organization provides employees with information
about how pay is determined. (R)
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Table B1. Principal axis factor analysis, oblimin rotation (Stage 2).
Factor loadings
Employee
restriction

Item
1. An employee could be fired for discussing pay information at my organization.
2. Employees are well informed about pay policies at my organization.
3. I am provided my job’s pay range.
4. I am provided the pay average for every job in my organization.
5. I know about the different types, sizes, and/or frequencies of pay increases presently available.
6. I know whether my pay is above, below, or equal to the average pay for my job.
7. My organization distributes pay ranges for every job in the organization.
8. My organization does not allow employees to discuss their own pay with coworkers.
9. My organization does not have a policy, procedure, or unwritten standard on discussing pay information.
10. My organization does not provide employees with the procedures used to establish pay.
11. My organization enforces the policy/rule that forbids employees from discussing their pay with each other.
12. My organization has a policy forbidding employees from discussing pay information with coworkers.
13. My organization has a rule to not share pay information with other employees.
14. My organization has a solid pay structure/model that I understand.
15. My organization is very strict in regard to employees not talking about pay.
16. My organization makes it clear how pay is determined for my job.
17. My organization makes it clear that pay should not be discussed under any circumstances.
18. My organization makes the entire pay structure/model available.
19. My organization provides employees with information about how pay is determined.
20. My organization requires employees to sign a contractual agreement stating they will comply with the pay
secrecy policy by not discussing their individual pay information with coworkers.
21. My organization suggests individual pay information should be kept private.
22. My organization verbally expresses a pay secrecy policy/rule with employees.
23. There are no negative consequences for discussing pay at my organization.
24. There is a statement in my organization’s employee handbook/manual stating employees should not discuss
their pay with coworkers.

Organizational
restriction

.76
.57
.73
.59
.75
.59
.68
.85
.53
.61
.79
.85
.86
.82
.87
.81
.93
.78
.81
.63
.65
.83
.71
.80

Note. Numbers shown are dominant factor loadings. N = 306.
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Table C1. Pay communication model fit indices.
Measurement model
Employee Restriction subfactor
Organizational Restriction subfactor
One-factor model
Two-factor model

χ2
401.41
128.63
2999.50
843.42

df
35
14
119
118

CFI
.94
.96
.70
.93

NFI
.94
.95
.69
.91

GFI
.88
.94
.52
.86

RMSEA
.13
.12
.20
.10

AVE
72%
71%
77%
77%

Cronbach’s α
.96
.91
.94
.94

Note. The two-factor model represents the overall Pay Communication scale. N = 611.

Table C2. Correlations between pay communication, similar measures, and dissimilar measures.
Observed correlations
Comparison measure
Noy’s POPS scale
Noy’s Policies and Rules subfactor
Noy’s Enforcement subfactor
Noy’s Organizational Norms subfactor
Mulvey’s Pay Knowledge scale
Day’s Pay Communication scale
Huselid’s HPWP scale
Huselid’s Employee Skills and Organizational Structures subdimension
Huselid’s Employee Motivation subdimension

Employee restriction
.94**
.93**
.91**
.78**
−-.34**
−-.17**
−-.09*
−-.11**
−-.04

Organizational Restriction
.49**
.44**
.45**
.54**
−-.84**
−-.72**
−-.57**
−-.56**
−-.44**

Pay Communication (overall)
.89**
.87**
.86**
.81**
−-.63**
−-.46**
−-.33**
−-.34**
−-.23**

Note: N = 611.
* p < .05; ** p < .01.

Table C3. Squared correlations and average variance extracted for pay communication and dissimilar measures.
Squared correlations
Comparison measure
Huselid’s HPWP scale
Huselid’s Employee Skills and Organizational Structures
subdimension
Huselid’s Employee Motivation subdimension

AVE
40.2%
40.5%
39.4%

Employee
restriction
72.4%
.01
.01
.00

Note. Numbers in boldface indicate average variance extracted (AVE) for that construct. N = 611.

Organizational
Restriction
70.8%
.32
.31
.19

Pay Communication
(overall)
76.6%
.11
.12
.05

